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Реферат: First James (Исторические личности)
The First James of Scotland By Rballoch.
James1 of Scotland
============================================= On 20 February, 1437 King James I of Scotland was assasinated. In memory of this King, I have written a small biography of his life and his reign. This by no means is a full account of the events in the Kings life -- or the events that took place in Scotland at the time, but the major events are covered to give an idea who this man was. JAMES I of Scotland
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King of Scots (1424--37), born in Dunfermline, Fife, the second son of Robert III. After his elder brother David was murdered at Falkland (1402), allegedly by his uncle, the Duke of Albany, James was sent for safety to France, but was captured by the English, and remained a prisoner for 18 years. Albany meanwhile ruled Scotland as governor until his death in 1420, when his son, Murdoch, assumed the regency,
and the country rapidly fell into disorder. The Regents
=================== James Stewart of the Royal house of Stuart spent most of his childhood life in exile as a prisoner of the English. The Scots who ruled in his absence as regents would not pay his high ransom the English demanded for his return to Scotland. Finally, after 18 years in exile, his countrymen agreed to his ransom and James returned to Scotland. Scotland was in a near state of armed insurrection when James returned. The previous regent, Murdoch, had been a poor and corrupt regent and the clan feuds in the Highlands continued unabated. In the Lowlands and Borders, the Border Barons rode their raids, terrorized the burghs, and pursued the Crowns revenues by theiving the crown taxes for themselves. Less that 4% of revenues were actually reaching Edinburgh when James took over. Murdoch, the regent soon regretted paying for James's return. "If God gives me but a dog's life," said James when he saw and heard what had befallen his country, "I will make the key keep the castle and the bracken bush keep the cow through all Scotland". In a week after his coronation a parliament at Perth declared that peace would be enforced throughout the realm, and of "any man presume to make war against another he shall suffer the full penalties of the law." Once released (1424), James dealt ruthlessly with potential rivals to his authority, executing Murdoch and his family. Within a year, James had broken the power of his cousins the Albany Stewarts and seized their estates. Upon some real or contrived charge of treason, the former regent of Scotland who had let James remain a prisoner in England so long, Murdoch and his two sons, with the aged father-in-law of one of them, were first imprisoned and then taken to the heading-block at Stirling. There were men who mourned their death, despite all the corruption, believing them friends of the poor and the victims of James's tyranny. The romantic and frequently misguided attachment to the unsuccessful members of the House of Stewart has deep roots in Scotland's history.
James Takes Control of Scotland
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He was 32 when he came back to Scotland, of medium height but large-boned and thickset, quick in his movements like a fox. He was an athlete, rider and wrestler, skilled with bow and spear, and proud of the strength in his broad chest and muscled arms. His darting and inquisitive mind was fascinated by the machinery of war, gunnery in particular, as it intrigued most men of the day. He was also a poet and
muscian, and almost unique in the contradictory powers of tranquil reflection and uncompromising action. Beyond firm government perhaps, the greatest gift he brought to a bleak Scotland was some of the first of its lyrical verse. Idle as a prisoner, albiet well kept prisoner, in England he had read all he could, and his long poem "The Kingis Quair", inspired by Chaucer's translation of a French allegory, is a soft voice speaking with a love of evocative words. James was the first of many Stewart kings to act as a patron of the arts, and almost certainly wrote the tender, passionate collection of poems, ("The King's Quire" or book), c.1423--4. It was not a woeful wretch who came home to Scotland, but the first real king the country had had since the death of Robert Bruce in 1329. His bride was Joan Beaufort, a niece of English king Henry IV, and a sixth of his ransom had been obligingly remitted as her dowry. It was not only a marriage of dynastic arrangement, and many believe the tender poem referred to above , was about her as he viewed her from his prison tower, and fell in love with as she walked among the court. From James I, perhaps comes that legendary Stewart charm, more disasterous to Scotland than an Albany's corrupt rule. But, the man who had sighed and written for and about love at a garden window in London, was merciless and resolute on a throne. His concern for law and order, while it was needed to secure his crown, also had roots in a poet's sense of justice, but he did not respond like a poet. When he had exterminated his cousins, he turned upon the Highlands. He was the first
of his family to treat the clans like cattle, showing that contempt most of them had for the Gaelic people, and making the Highlander's ultimate self- sacrifice for the House of Stewart as pointless as it was herioc. He summoned over 40 Highland Chiefs in 1428 before him and his parliament at Inverness. Among the Highlanders were Alexander of the Isles, (the current Lord of the Isles), the son of Donald of Harlaw. They were greeted as thugs upon arrival, as each appeared before the throne he was seized by men-at-arms and thrown into the dungeon pit. One by one, the Chiefs of Clan Donald, MacKay, MacKenzie, Campbell and all the tribes and leaders of the north, while the poet king entertained the
parliament with a witty Latin squib on their certain hempen departure. In fact, three were hanged and the rest released after a brutal , but short imprisonment. Clemency was granted for any offences they might have commited, but it was wasted on Alexander of the Isles. He and his wild Islanders, remembered the treachery that had preceded it, and when King and parliament were gone, came back by ship over rivers, and burnt the burgh of Inverness to the ground, one of seven bonfires which
the MacDonald's lit upon that ground in their clan's riotous history. James marched to Lochaber, isolated Alexander from his allies, and forced him to come to Edinburgh in submission. Wearing shirt and drawers only, holding his 2 handed claymore by the blade, he knelt before the high altar of Holyrood and humbly offered the hilt of the weapon to the king. James would have hanged him, it is said, but for the intercession of the Queen, and was instead sent to a Lothian castle in the keeping of a Douglas earl. In the 13 years he strengthened the machinery of government and justice, replacing the baron's law with the king's law, and restoring the crown to a respect it had not received since Bruce's heart was taken from his rib cage. Copies of law were distributed among all sheriffs so that no man might claim ignorance of the law. Of course this really only worked in the Lowlands, as the Highlands and Isles were still ruled by the clan system and the supreme authority there, was the individual Chief of the clan -- with the King coming in a distant second. Justice was attempted to be available to all, but since this principle was easier to enact through parliament than to put into actual practise, the king himself chose a special court from the Three Estates to consider complaints and abuses. He also set up a commitee of wise and discreet men to examine the laws at intervals, and to advise upon their admendment if neccessary. The power of the civil justice and criminal courts were strengthened under James I's reign. He clearly wished to
establish a parliament such as he had seen at work in England. For more information of his mammoth changes to Scottish courts and parliaments, see the book "Scotland from the Earliest Times to 1603" - by William Croft Dickinson. (Although it may be difficult to obtain a copy). Though orthodox in faith and sincere in piety, he was a rough opponent of Rome when he felt it threatened his own countries independence. He denied the Pope's power of provision, the right to appoint bishops to vacant sees on Scotland, and thus have influence over one of the estates in its parliament.It had become the kings right to approve a bishop-elect before consecration and papal promotion, and he stopped his churchmen from bargaining with Rome for these benefices, arguing with some justice that the traffic was impoverishing his kingdom. With his parliament, he declared this "barratry" illegal, taxed the export of gold and silver, and forbade the clerics to travel abroad without royal license, the Pope demanded the repeal of the acts. The king's response was to acknowledge the authority of the Counsil of Basle, which had attempted to reform such papal powers of provision. He was hard and exacting on the true duties of his churchmen, and ordered them to set their house in order, lest the crown's past generousity be cut. But, Scotlands detestment of so called "heretics", which resulted in the first heretical buring, during the regent before James' reign, was started again in 1433. A second was burnt, Paul
Crawar, a reasonable fellow by the sound of him, a Bohemian graduate of medicine and the arts who had come to St. Andrews University as an emissary of the Hussites. He was said to have preached free love and socialism (or a form of it) by his detractors, that enduring combination of human desires. The smoldering flames that would spread from his burning, burnt longer than his judges could have imagined. Law, administration, and political and church reform were all done or attempted during James I's reign. No king had done so much for Scotland, outside of war and independence, since Alexander II, and few had so many enemies. The work he set off was too great for any one man, and in his efforts to break the powers of the barons he was often careless and foolish. He alienated the Douglases (one of the most powerful Lowland Scottish families) by imprisoning their earl, and deprived the Earl of March of his title and estates because of his father's desertion to the English 30 years before. Four-fifths of his ransom was yet to be paid and many of the lords had kinsman still held hostage in England, and bitterly resented the kings indifference to them. His custom of appropriating estates to the crown when there was doubt about an heir may have been good housekeeping or feudal custom, but most men considered it robbery. His large family of first and distant cousins was full of jealousy, spite, envy and greed, and it was perhaps inevitable that this Stewart king should die by a Stewart plot. He himself made it possible by weaking his prestige with a half-hearted war with England. On her way to marry the Dauphin his daughter Margaret narrowly escaped a piratical attack by an English ship, and what seems on the surface to be a good excuse, James besieged the castle of Roxburgh, which had been in English hands now, for 100 years. He abandoned it without assualt, the reason is unclear, but it is said that his wife warned him of plots against him if he pressd on. And there was
a plot, within his own family and his own household, and the unpopularity of the king's withdrawl from a chivalrous field (the castle) gave the plotters courage. At it's veiled centre was the Earl of Atholl, "that old servant of many evil days", a son of Robert II's second marriage and by his own reckoning the rightful king of Scotland.
His son, Sir Robert Stewart, was the King's Chamberlain, and it was he who found a willing assassin in Sir Robert Graham, a man with his own festering grudge and a scarred memory of the imprisonment and banishment. At the end of 1436 James went to keep Christmas with the Dominican friars at Perth. As he crossed the Forth a Highland woman warned him that he would never return alive, a common warning in Scots history and just as commonly ignored. She followed him to Perth, it is said, repeating her tedious warnings, and she was present on the night of February 20 when Robert Stewart opened the door of the convent where the King was staying, and admitted the Graham. James was in his wife's chamber, talking to her and her ladies, relaxed in his dressing-gown, amused by the Highland's woman's last warning and telling stories of omens and premonitions. When he heard the noise of heavy feet, clanking armour, his quick mind sensed what they meant. He wrenched up the planking of the floor and dropped into a vault or drain below, hoping to escape into a court beyond but forgetting that its mouth had recently been sealed to prevent his tennis-balls from rolling into it. Graham and his eight confederates broke into the room, dragged
out the fighting King, and butchered him with twenty-eight dagger-strokes. The Queen was wounded in her efforts to save her husband, and it might have been better for Graham had he killed her too since he had gone this far. This "freshest and fairest flower" of the King's youth became a tigress in revenge. Atholl and Robert Stewart, Graham and his hired cutthroats were soon taken, and suffered long and appalling torture until the Queen's grief was satisfied and they were sent to the merciful headsman. And so ended the life of James I of Scotland on 20 February, 1437....560 years ago this year.
Реферат на тему: HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?
THE UNIVERSITY OF HULL
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS
The Politics of Eastern Europe
HOW SIGNIFICANT WAS ALEXANDER DUBCEK IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REFORMIST COMMUNISM?
By: Jonas Daniliauskas
Tutor: T.P. McNeill
March 17, 1995
The Introduction.
The aim of this essay is to answer the question: “How significant was Alexander Dubcek in the development of reformist communism?” This question raises the other questions. Was Dubcek the inspirer of all the reforms which took place in Czechoslovakia in 1967-1969? How much did he himself influence all the reformist processes? How much he had achieved in implementing his ideas? Dubcek became famous only in 1967. Before that he was almost unknown in the international politics. He was known only in the Czechoslovak Communist Party (CPCS), where he had almost no influence on the major decisions (until 1967, of course). His promotion after the returning from the Moscow where he was studying for three years in the advanced Party school attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), was quite rapid. In 1960 he was elected to the Secretariat of the CPCS; in 1962 to the Presidium of the CPCS; in 1963 he became the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party; finally, on January 5, 1968 he replaced Antonin Novotny as the First Secretary of the CPCS. He was the youngest leader of ruling Communist Party (after Fidel Castro), and the first Slovak in such a high position. Though he stayed in this post relatively short - until April 17, 1969, when he was replaced by Gustav Husak, his name became known world-wide.
Why did the reforms begin?
The Czechoslovak crisis deepened in 1967, and showed itself in four spheres:[1] 1. Slovakia; 2. The economy; 3. The legal system; 4. Party and ideology. Since the 1962 the Czechoslovak economy suddenly began to show signs of a critical decline. That happened inevitably, because in the Stalin years the expansion of heavy industry was pushed at the expense of development of all other productive sectors of the economy. The result of this was growing inefficiency of production, failure to modernise production technology, a decline in the quality of exports, a loss of markets, and a drop in the effectiveness of foreign trade.[2] In August 1962 the Third-Five-Year Plan had to be abandoned before completion.[3] In this situation the Slovaks began to act. Many of them realised that specific Slovak interests might best be served by destalinization and even liberalisation.[4] The problem also was the rehabilitation of the victims of the purge trials of 1949-1954. Novotny himself and other leading members of his regime had personally participated in the preparation and conduct of the purge trials. So, the rehabilitation was perceived as the direct threat to the security and the survival of the regime.[5] All these factors only decreased the level of CPCS’s legitimacy.
The Development of Reforms.
The startpoint of the reforms was the session of the Central Committee of the CPCS on October 30-31, 1967. Dubcek raised an objection against Novotny and produced statistics suggesting that Slovakia was being continuously cheated in economic matters.[6] This speech inspired discussion what was the unprecedented thing in the Central Committee. The next session of the Central Committee started on December 19. Josef Smrkovsky proposed the separation of the posts of President and First Secretary: “It is unsatisfactory that an excessive number of duties should be piled upon one pair of shoulders.”[7] In both sessions the three issues were at stake. First, the implementation of the economic reforms, secondly, freedom of expression and, finally, effective autonomy for Slovakia. Finally, at the Central Committee Plenum on January 5, 1968, Novotny was replaced at the post of the First Secretary by Dubcek. Also four new Presidium members were elected to strengthen Dubcek’s position - J.Spacek, J.Boruvka, E.Rigo, and J.Piller. So, the Prague Spring started at the top levels of the CPCS. But soon, as we would see, the Party will loose its ability to control the developments. At the same time, the hot political debate started in the press, on radio and television. The main issues were the Communist Party, democracy, the autonomy of Slovakia, the collapsing economy, and the problem of justice and legality.[8] On February 14, the first public political discussion took place in Prague. The next changes in the leadership were Novotny’s resignation from the Presidency on March 22 and General Ludvik Svoboda’s election on this post on March 30, Oldrich Ciernik’s appointment on the post of Prime Minister and the formation of the new cabinet on April 8, the election of the new Presidium of the CPCS, and the election of Josef Smrkovsky on the post of the Chairman of the National Assembly. On April 9, the CPCS announced its ‘Action Programme’, officially known as ‘Czechoslovakia’s Road to Socialism’, as a basis for reforming communism in the country. In this document the CPCS promised: (1) new guarantees of freedom of speech, press, assembly and religious observance; (2) electoral laws to provide a broader choice of candidates, greater freedom for the four non-communist parties within the National Front; (3) upgrading of the parliament and the government with regard to the power of the CPCS apparatus; (4) broad economic reforms to give enterprises greater independence, to achieve a convertible currency, to revive a limited amount of private enterprise and to increase trade with Western countries; (5) an independent judiciary; (6) federal status for Slovakia on an independent basis and a new constitution to be drafted by the end of 1969.[9] The Central Committee also pledged a “full and just rehabilitation of all persons” who had been unjustly persecuted during 1949 -1954. But this programme promised less than the people actually wanted. The ‘Action Programme’ remained outside the mainstream of the powerful social process which had been set in motion in January.[10] The people expected more reforms, more freedom. But Dubcek and other reformats tried to be more moderate, to find the way for the gradual reforms. The Presidium of the CPCS prohibited the renovation of the Social Democratic Party and the Ministry of Interior announced that the formation of political parties would be considered illegal. But at the same time this Ministry sanctioned the activity of the Club of Engaged Non-Party Members (KAN), and recognised the legal statute of another big club - K-231. Gradually the reformats found themselves in the position which will become vital for them all. They found themselves between two different forces. One force was the majority of the Czech and the Slovak nations who wanted more radical changes. The other force was represented by the Stalinists, by Moscow, and by the leadership of the other countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO). One of the major reforms was the law of June 26, which abolished prepublication censorship. On the next day the famous manifesto, entitled ‘2,000 Words to Workers, Farmers, Scientists, Artists and Everyone’ appeared in Literarni listy. The manifesto gave assurances of complete support of Dubcek’s regime, “if necessary, even with arms.”[11] The leaders of the SU, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and East Germany viewed the reforms taking place in Czechoslovakia as the threat for all the Communist Bloc. The first clearly expressed concern was so-called Warsaw Letter. It was sent on July 15, 1968, and addressed to the Central Committee of the CPCS. It proved the clear evidence of the WTO leaders’ lack of confidence in the leadership of the CPCS, and contained critical references to Czechoslovakia’s foreign policy.[12]There was expressed warning that the Czechoslovak reform policy was ‘completely unacceptable’.[13]The Presidium of the CPCS Central Committee on July 18 rejected as unfounded the accusations made in the Warsaw Letter and affirmed that the country’s new policies were aimed at strengthening socialism.[14] The clear signs of crisis in relations between Prague and Moscow appeared. On July 19 Moscow issued a summons to the CPCS Presidium, demanding that it meet July 22 or 23 with the Soviet Politburo in Moscow, Kiev or Lvov to discuss internal Czechoslovak developments. 9 full members of the CPSU Politburo and the entire CPCS Presidium met on July 29 in the Slovak village Cierna-nad-Tisou. Dubcek and the other reformats regarded the outcome of the Cierna talks as a ‘Czechoslovak victory’. It had brought the annulment of the Warsaw Letter; the departure of Soviet troops was guaranteed, and the country’s sovereignty had been defended.[15] The fact that the agreement was regarded as the ‘victory’ shows that Dubcek and the other reformers were really driven by naпvetй and idealism and hoped that they could create the socialism with the ‘human face’ without the interference from the Moscow side. They really underestimated their own significance to the Soviets. Moscow regarded the reformats developments in the Czechoslovakia as the real threat for the future of the all Communist Bloc. A common view that the danger of a Czechoslovak desertion from the socialist camp and a revision of foreign policy by the Dubcek leadership hastened the Soviet decision to occupy the country militarily.[16]
The Invasion.
On August 16 the CPSU Politburo stated that “the CPCS was loosing its leading role in the country.”[17] This showed that the Soviet’s patience reached the end. “When Moscow’s nerve breaks, Soviet tanks usually start rolling.”[18] Armed forces of the SU, East Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria invaded Czechoslovakia in a swift military action during the night of August 20-21. Dubcek and other Czech and Slovak leaders were arrested in the name of the “revolutionary government of the workers and peasants.”[19] The main force of the initial invading units consisted of an estimated 200,000 troops. The number of invaders continued to increase during the following week and ultimately reached an estimated 650,000.[20]Most of the members of the CPCS Presidium were shocked by the invasion. This proves again that they did not understand how serious the situation was before the invasion. From the Moscow’s point of view the invasion was inevitable, because the further development of the socialism with the ‘human face’ would lead only to deeper escalation of tensions between the Czechoslovakia and the other WTO countries, and probably, to an escape of the country from the Communist Bloc. But the reformats did not give up. On August 21, the CPCS Central Committee declared the statement that the invasion was taking place “without the knowledge” of the Czechoslovak leaders, and that they regarded this act “as contrary not only to the fundamental principles of relations between Socialist states but also as contrary to the principles of international law.”[21]Although there was no organised resistance to the overwhelming occupation forces, Czechoslovak citizens, spearheaded by students, resorted to a wide variety of means to hamper the invaders, and several general strikes took place.[22] On August 23, President Svoboda flew to Moscow. His journey represented an effort to find a way out of a situation: he was, in effect, trying to help the Soviets find a solution for the Czechoslovak crisis based on mutual political compromise.[23]On August 26 the Moscow agreement was concluded. The major outcomes were: (1) Dubcek was to carry on as the First Secretary; (2) the invasion forces were to be gradually withdrawn; (3) censorship was to be reintroduced; (4) the CPCS was to strengthen its leading position in the state.[24]One may assume that certain personnel changes were also assumed in Moscow, since resignations followed in due course. These changes included the removal of Dr. Kriegel from the CPCS Presidium and the chairmanship of the National Front; of Ota Sik as Deputy Premier; Josef Pavel as Minister of Interior; Jiri Hajek as Foreign Minister; Zdenek Heizar as Director of Czechoslovak Radio; Jiri Pelikan as Director of Czehoslovak Television.[25] The invasion led to the formulation of so-called Brezhnev Doctrine, first formulated in a Pravda commentary on September 26, which amounts to denying in principle the sovereignty of any “socialist” country accessible to the SU. It asserts the region-wide right to intervention.[26] For both rulers and ruled, the invasion of Czechoslovakia proved once again that the Soviets would use force to prevent developments they defined as contrary to their vital interests. The line they drew in 1968 to define their vital interests was the Leninist hegemony of the local Communist Party.[27] But the Soviets did not achieved what they wanted at once. What happened was that the invasion failed to achieve its primary purpose, which clearly was to produce a counterregime a la Kadar.[28]
The Situation After the Invasion.
The Dubcek leadership made great efforts after the invasion to satisfy the Soviets while trying not to compromise itself in the eyes of the population.[29] Probably the major reform after the invasion was the creation of the Slovak Socialist Republic. On October 28, the National Assembly approved a constitutional bill transforming the hitherto unitary state into a federation of two national republics. On January 1, 1969, the Slovak Socialist Republic came into being. Another crisis emerged in January 1969. On January 7, the new measures were taken designed to keep the press and the other media more strictly under control. In some cases, pre-publication censorship was reintroduced.[30] The event which finally decided the fate of Dubcek is known as the ‘ice-hockey game affair.’ On March 28, the Czechoslovak ice-hockey team won over the SU team in World Ice Hockey Championship Competition. The same evening anti-Soviet demonstrations occurred throughout Czechoslovakia. Aeroflot office was destroyed in Prague. On April 11 Gustav Husak declared that it was ‘high time’ to take radical steps to introduce order.[31] Finally, on April 17 at the plenary session of the Central Committee Dubcek was replaced by Gustav Husak (before that - the First Secretary of the Slovak Communist Party). At the same session the CPCS Presidium with its twenty-one members and the Executive Committee with its eight members were replaced by an eleven members Presidium of which Dubcek (but no longer Smrkovsky) was still member. A few days later he was ‘elected’ Chairman of the Federal Assembly with Smrkovsky as his deputy. On January 28, 1970, the Central Committee plenum ‘accepted the resignation’ of Dubcek from the Central Committee. And finally, on June 25, 1970 at the session of the Central Committee he was expelled from the CPCS. This was the end of his political career. But only until the end of the Communism regime in 1989. At the end of December 1989 he was elected Chairman of the Czech parliament.
Conclusion: Was the Reformist Communism Ever Possible?
The primary goal of Dubcek’s reforms was the creation of the socialism with a ‘human face’. Broadly speaking, the Czechoslovak reformers sought an adjustment of the standard Soviet model of socialism to the realities of what they considered an advanced industrialised socialist country enjoying a tradition of democracy and humanitarianism.[32]The stated opinions of the reformers could be summed as follows: (1) the CPCS should no longer maintain a monopoly of power and decision making; (2) it should rather prove its goals through equal competition by permitting a clash of ideas and interests; (3) the abandonment of this monopoly would in effect mean a sharing of power and permit criticism, opposition, and even control on the CPCS’s own exercise of power.[33]Of course, Dubcek was against the creation of the opposition parties, but he was for the pluralism inside the National Front. The essence of his reform conception was not the possibility of pluralism in the accepted sense but, rather, the obligation upon the CPCS to prove that its program was the only valid one for socialism.[34] It was very naive to consider that Moscow will remain indifferent to such developments. Gradually the Soviets understood that the reformers are not controlling the reforms, and this led to the invasion. The Soviet interests were threatened almost exclusively by developments inside the Czechoslovakia. In other words, precisely by that ‘human face’ which Dubcek wanted to give Czechoslovak socialism.[35] There was one thing which Dubcek considered to be not important, but in fact, this led to the end of the reforms. He underestimated the impact of his own reforms upon Moscow. The Soviet reaction to the reforms was quite logical and inevitable. The Communist power elite would never have accepted conditions which would make the free play of political forces possible. It would never given up the power.[36] So, was Dubcek significant in developing the reformist communism? In the short term - yes, but in the long term the practical meaning of his reforms was nil. All the things he reformed were returned back. The only positive impact (in the long term) of the reforms was the psychological impact of the attempt to improve the improvable thing. Communism can not be reformed. The only way to change it is to overthrow it completely. There is no way in the middle. The reformist communism is simply an utopia.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Ames, K., ‘Reform and Reaction’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.38-49 2. Devlin, K., ‘The New Crisis in European Communism’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.57-68 3. Golan, G., ‘The Road to Reform’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.11-21 4. Golan, G., ‘Innovations in the Model of the Socialism: Political Reforms in Czechoslovakia, 1968’, in Shapiro, J.P. and Potichnyj, P.J. (eds.), Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), pp.77-94 5. Lowenthal, R., ‘The Sparrow in the Cage’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, pp.2-28 6. Mastny, V., (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972) 7. Provaznik, J., ‘The Politics of Retrenchment’, in Problems of Communism, 1969, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, pp.2-16 8. Sik, O., ‘The Economic Impact of Stalinism’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, pp.1-10 9. Simons, Th.W., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World, (2nd. ed., London: Macmillan, 1993) 10. Svitak, I., The Czechoslovak Experiment: 1968-1969 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971) 11. Tigrid, P., Why Dubcek Fell (London: Macdonald, 1971) 12. White, St., Batt, J. and Lewis, P.J. (eds.), Developments in East European Politics (London: Macmillan, 1993)
----------------------- [1]Tigrid, P., Why Dubcek Fell (London: Macdonald, 1971), p.17 [2]Sik, O., ‘The Economic Impact of Stalinism’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, p.5 [3]Golan, G., ‘The Road to Reform’, in Problems of Communism, 1971, Vol. 20, No. 3, p.12 [4]Ibid., p.13 [5]Ibid., p.11 [6]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.19 [7]Ibid., p.30 [8]Ibid., p.43 [9]Mastny, V., (ed.), Czechoslovakia: Crisis in World Communism (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1972), p.21 [10]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.48 [11]Ames, K., ‘Reform and Reaction’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, p.48 [12]Tigrid, P. op.cit., p.57 [13]Mastny, V., op.cit., p.37 [14]Ibid., p.40 [15]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.89 [16]Ibid., p.53 [17]Ibid., p.69 [18]Ibid., p.53 [19]Svitak, I., The Czechoslovak Experiment 1968-1969 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1971), p.109 [20]Mastny, V., op.cit., p.69 [21]Ibid., p.71 [22]Ibid., p.76 [23]Provaznik, J., ‘The Politics of Retrenchment’, in Problems of Communism, 1969, Vol. 18, No. 4-5, p.3 [24]Svitak, I., op.cit., p.109 [25]Provaznik, J., op.cit., p.4 [26]Lowenthal, R., ‘The Sparrow in the Cage’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol. 17, No. 6, p.24 [27]Simons, Th.W., Eastern Europe in the Postwar World (2nd. ed., London: Macmillan, 1993), p.124 [28]Devlin, K., ‘The New Crisis in European Communism’, in Problems of Communism, 1968, Vol.17, No. 6, p.61 [29]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.138 [30]Ibid., p.153 [31]Ibid., p.164 [32]Golan, G., ‘Inovations in the Model of Socialism: Political Reforms in Czechoslovakia, 1968’, in Shapiro, J.P. and Potichnyj, P.J. (eds.), Change and Adaptation in Soviet and East European Politics (New York, Washington, London: Praeger Publishers, 1976), p.78 [33]Ibid., p.81 [34]Ibid., p.87 [35]Tigrid, P., op.cit., p.66 [36]Ibid., p.98
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